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Abstract
The NLM stream cipher designed by HoonJae Lee, SangMin Sung, HyeongRag Kim is a strengthened version of
the LM summation generator that combines linear and non-linear feedback shift registers. In recent works, the NLM
cipher has been used for message authentication in lightweight communication over wireless sensor networks and for
RFID authentication protocols.
The work analyses the security of the NLM stream cipher and the NLM-MAC scheme that is built on the top of
the NLM cipher. We first show that the NLM cipher suffers from two major weaknesses that lead to key recovery and
forgery attacks. We prove the internal state of the NLM cipher can be recovered with time complexity about nlog7×2,
where the total length of internal state is 2 · n + 2 bits. The attack needs about n2 key-stream bits. We also show
adversary is able forge any MAC tag very efficiently by having only one pair (MAC tag, cipher-text). The proposed
attacks are practical and break the scheme with a negligible error probability.
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1. Introduction
The summation generator (10) designed by Rainer
Rueppel produces keystream bits by adding output bits
of two linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and the
carry bit of an adder. The cipher exhibits many desir-
able cryptographic propertied. It produces a key stream
of maximum period, achieves near maximum linear com-
plexity and maximum order of correlation immunity. Un-
fortunately, it is insecure against the correlation and al-
gebraic attacks. In 2000, Hoon Jae Leea and Sang Jae
Moon proposed an improved summation generator with
2-bit memory (5). We call it the LM generator. The anal-
ysis published in (1; 9) shows that the cipher is vulner-
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able to correlation attacks. This weakness is the result
of a high correlation between the input variables and the
output sequences of the combining function. Also, an ef-
ficient attack that recovers the internal state of the cipher
in real time has been published in (2).
In 2009 Hoon Jae Lee, Sang Min Sung, and Hyeong
Rag Kim published another version of the LM generator
(see (4)). They called it the NLM stream cipher. The main
feature of the cipher that was supposed to strengthen the
cipher is the addition of a non-linear feedback shift reg-
ister. Using the NLM stream cipher, Lee et al. have re-
cently proposed a lightweight secure data communication
framework - see (3) for details. A part of the framework is
a new MAC function that is intended to enhance security
of wireless sensor networks. The NLM stream cipher is
suitable for implementation requiring a small number of
gates as confirmed by the work of Lee and Lee (6). Be-
cause of the attractive features, the NLM stream cipher
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has been deployed in two RFID authentication protocols
(8; 7). Also Lee, Kim and Lee in (7) use the NLM cipher
in their Internet protocol that establishes a secure access
for mobile users.
The analysis presented in this paper shows weaknesses
of the NLM cipher and discusses their impact on the se-
curity of the protocols it supports. We conclude that the
NLM-MAC scheme is completely insecure and the NLM
cipher is not recommended.
2. Description of NLM-MAC Scheme
In this section, we first describe the NLM-128 cipher.
Then, we explain how the NLM-MAC function works.
For details, the reader is referred to the original paper (4).
2.1. NLM-128 Stream Cipher
The cipher is based on the summation generation,
which uses the LFSR and NLFSR sequences and the two
bits, namely a carry bit (ci) and a memory bit (di). Figure
1 shows the overall structure of the cipher. The LFSR is
defined by its primitive polynomial P(x) of the following
form:
P(x) = x127 + x109 + x91 + x84 + x73 + x67 + x66 + x63
+ x56 + x55 + x48 + x45 + x42 + x41 + x37 + x34
+ x30 + x27 + x23 + x21 + x20 + x19 + x16 + x13
+ x12 + x7 + x6 + x2 + 1
NLFSR uses a non-linear feedback function f (x) of de-
gree 129, where
f (x) = x5 ⊕ x9 ⊕ x13 ⊕ x17 ⊕ x21 ⊕ x25 ⊕ x29 ⊕
x33 ⊕ x37 ⊕ x41 ⊕ x45 ⊕ x49 ⊕ x53 ⊕ x57 ⊕
x61 ⊕ x65 ⊕ x69 ⊕ x73 ⊕ x77 ⊕ x81 ⊕ x85 ⊕
x89 ⊕ x93 ⊕ x97 ⊕ x101 ⊕ x105 ⊕ x109 ⊕ (1)
x113 ⊕ x117 ⊕ x121 ⊕ x125 ⊕ x129 ⊕
(x1 · x2 · · · x128 · x129).
The carry bit c j and the additional memory bit d j are up-
dated according to the following relations:
c j = a j · b j ⊕ (a j ⊕ b j) · c j−1 (2)
d j = b j ⊕ (a j ⊕ b j) · d j−1 (3)
Finally, the keystream bit z j is generated as shown below:
z j = a j ⊕ b j ⊕ c j−1 ⊕ d j−1 (4)
Figure 1: The NLM Cipher
2.2. NLM-MAC Function
Given a ciphertext (CT) and a MAC key (denoted by
Kmac), the MAC value is computed according to the fol-
lowing steps:
1. CT is split into 32-bit words and then the last word
is padded with zeros if required.
2. Kmac is fed through four 32-bit variables l, m, n, p,
where they are 32-bit words initialised by the MAC
key, where the sequence ({l, m, n, p} = Kmac(128 −
bit)). Then Kmac is xor-ed with 32-bit CT words and
with 32-bit of l.
3. After xor-ing all 32-bit CT words with l, the NLM-
MAC value will be generated as follows:
NLM-MAC = l ⊕ m ⊕ n ⊕ p
Note: The protocol uses a time stamp to check freshness
of the messages. The time stamp has no impact on our
proposed attack.
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3. Analysis of NLM-MAC Scheme
In this section, we reveal weak points of the NLM al-
gorithm and describe details of our attack. We prove not
only that it is possible to break the NLM cipher but also
an adversary is able to create valid MAC tags for fake
messages very efficiently.
3.1. Analysis of NLM Cipher
First, we identify weaknesses of the cipher.
1. In their work (2), Han and Lee show that the alge-
braic degree of LM generators can be kept constant
and equal to 2. This fact can be established as fol-
lows. We start from two Equations (2) and (3) and
add them. This gives us the following relation
c j ⊕ d j = a jb j ⊕ b j ⊕ (a j ⊕ b j)(c j−1 ⊕ d j−1).
If we put c j−1 ⊕ d j−1 = z j ⊕ (a j ⊕ b j) to Equation (4),
we obtain the following equation
c j ⊕ d j = a jb j ⊕ b j ⊕ (a j ⊕ b j)(z j ⊕ (a j ⊕ b j)) (5)
Substituting ( j + 1) for j in Equation (4) and using
Equation (5), we finally have
z j+1 = a j+1 ⊕ b j+1 ⊕ a j ⊕ a jb j ⊕ (a j ⊕ b j)z j. (6)
Equation (6) creates equations of degree 2 connect-
ing 2 output bits (that can be observed by the adver-
sary) and the register outputs.
2. The NLM designers believe that replacing LFSR by
NLFSR strengthens the design and makes it resis-
tant against algebraic analysis. To keep the desirable
properties of LM cipher, they have used NLFSR that
has the maximum period (NLFSR is characterised
by its feedback function given by Equation 1). Al-
though the algebraic degree of feedback function (1)
is high and equal to 129, the non-linearity is surpris-
ingly low. The adversary can approximate the non-
linear feedback function with a linear function with
the following probability:
Pr( f (x) = L(x)) = 1 − 2−129
where
L(x) = x5 ⊕ x9 ⊕ x13 ⊕ x17 ⊕ x21 ⊕ x25 ⊕ x29
⊕ x33 ⊕ x37 ⊕ x41 ⊕ x45 ⊕ x49 ⊕ x53 ⊕ x57
⊕ x61 ⊕ x65 ⊕ x69 ⊕ x73 ⊕ x77 ⊕ x81 ⊕ x85
⊕ x89 ⊕ x93 ⊕ x97 ⊕ x101 ⊕ x105 ⊕ x109
⊕ x113 ⊕ x117 ⊕ x121 ⊕ x125 ⊕ x129.
The second weak point lets the adversary replace NLFSR
with LFSR defined by the feedback function L(x).
3.2. Attack stages
The cipher can be broken in the two following steps.
1. The adversary constructs the non-linear algebraic
system using the observations of the output bits and
creating system of relations derived from Equation
(6). The number of variables equals to the total
length of the shift registers and two memory bits (e.g.
n = 258). In the work (2), it is shown that the time
complexity of solving the system is O(n5.6) and the
attacks needs about n2 bits.
2. Next the adversary checks the validity of the recov-
ered internal state. To this end, adversary needs
to generate additional output bits by using the re-
covered internal state. The probability of recover-
ing incorrect internal state equals to 2−129 × n2 =
2−129 × (258)2 ≈ 2−111, which is still a negligible
probability. In addition, one can repeat the attack on
the next n2 bits of key-stream and find the internal
state to verify the previous result.
3.3. Analysis on NLM-MAC Function
The most critical point in the NLM-MAC function is
that the function is totally linear. It means that all relations
between the MAC secret key Kmac and the ciphertext are
constructed linearly. So one can compute the linear rela-
tion of Kmac words by having only one MAC tag and its
corresponding cipher-text. This leakage reveals the linear
relation of l, m, n, p which are enough to compute valid
MAC value for every arbitrary ciphertext. Suppose the ad-
versary possesses a valid MAC tag and its corresponding
ciphertext (CT). Then he splits the ciphertext into 32-bit
words and makes one 32-bit by xoring all the ciphertext
words with the Mac tag. The new computed words are
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actually the initial value for l⊕m⊕ n⊕ p. After this stage,
the adversary is able to compute another valid MAC value
for every ciphertext.
3.4. Attack on NLM Scheme
Now, we show how we can launch a key recovery at-
tacks on the NLM cipher and forge MAC values. What the
adversary needs is about 216 bits of keystream and a MAC
tag and its corresponding ciphertext. The attack proceeds
as follows.
1. For a ciphertext of length n2 bits, where n is the num-
ber of internal bits, the adversary finds the internal
state of the cipher with a negligible error probability.
2. For the pair (ciphertext, MAC tag), the adversary ap-
plies the attack from Section 3.3.
3. The adversary can send an arbitrary ciphertext along
with a valid MAC tag or by adding new plaintext bits
following the original plaintext, he can compute ci-
phertext and update the new MAC value. Another
approach is to replace the original plaintext with an
arbitrary text and compute corresponding ciphertext
and MAC tag.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we analysed the NLM-MAC scheme pro-
posed for lightweight applications such as wireless sen-
sor networks. We discovered some weaknesses leading
to two successful cryptographic attacks. The first attack
allows to recover the internal state with time complexity
about 244.86 and the required output bits about 216. The
second attack permits to forge a MAC tag for every ci-
phertext in real time. Finally, we proposed an attack on
the protocol, which lets adversary generate arbitrary ci-
phertexts along with a valid MAC tag. In conclusion, we
can say that the proposed scheme is totally insecure and it
is not recommended to be used.
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